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DOCTOR-TO-PATIENT TRANSMISSION
OF HEPATITIS B: A PROBLEM?
In 1991 the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) updated the
recommendations for preventing transmission of hepatitis B
virus (HBV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) to
patients during exposure-prone invasive procedures [1].
Based on analysis of reports in the literature and a prospect-
ive CDC study, the document states that infected health care
workers (HCW) who adhere to universal precautions and
who perform certain exposure-prone procedures pose a small
risk for transmitting HBV to patients. The risk of transmitting
HIV is much less. Infected HCWs who adhere to universal
precautions and who do not perform invasive procedures
pose no risk for transmitting HIV or HBV to patients.
Despite adherence to universal precautions, transmission
of HBV has been reported during certain oral, cardiotho-
racic, colorectal and obstetric/gynaecological procedures. In
the prospective study, percutaneous injuries occurred among
surgical personnel during 6.9% of operative procedures on
the general surgery, gynaecology, orthopaedic, cardiac and
trauma services. Percutaneous exposure of the patient to the
HCW’s blood may have occurred when the sharp object
causing the injury recontacted the patient’s open wound in
32% of the observed injuries to surgeons. The risk of doctor-
to-patient blood contact is thus » 3%. Characteristics of
exposure-prone procedures include digital palpation of a
needle tip in a body cavity or the simultaneous presence of
the HCW’s fingers and a needle or other sharp instrument in
a poorly visualized anatomic site.
In the period 1974–90, there were 20 published reports in
which treatment by a HBV-infected HCW was associated
with transmission of HBV. In 12 of these clusters, the
implicated HCW did not routinely wear gloves. In the
remaining eight clusters, transmission occurred despite
glove use. Of the HCWs whose hepatitis B e antigen (HBeAg)
status was determined (17 of 20), all were HBeAg positive.
The presence of HBeAg in serum reflects a phase of HBV
infection with high levels of circulating virus and great in-
fectivity.
Seven of the HCWs who were linked to published clusters
in the United States continued to perform invasive proce-
dures following modification of invasive techniques (double
gloving and restriction of certain high-risk procedures). For
five HCWs, no further transmission to patients was observed;
in two instances, HBV was transmitted to patients after
techniques were modified [1].
Since 1991 there have been nine published reports on
HCW–patient transmission of HBV according to MEDLINE. The
focus on these reports were unusual features such as trans-
mission by HBeAg-negative surgeons [2–4], severe outcome
of the HBV infection [2] or severe consequences for the
surgeon involved [5,6]. The number of published reports,
however, may not reflect the magnitude of the problem. In
the UK a registry has been set up after the investigation in the
early 1990s; this registry now contains seven cases since
1993, which suggests a public health problem of greater
extent than generally anticipated. This concept is supported
by the surfacing of two incidents in the last 5 years in the
Netherlands, a country of 15 million inhabitants. An article
in the lay-press that widely publicized a case of HBV trans-
mission by a cardiac surgeon in Aachen, Germany which
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SUMMARY. It is well-established that hepatitis B may be
transmitted from surgeons to their patients. Clear strategies
are needed to reduce the risk of transmission whilst not
discriminating unnecessarily against surgeons who may
pose no risks to their patients. This review outlines the
current position and provides a blueprint for action that may
reduce the risks to patients whilst minimizing the impact on
practising surgeons.
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also involved Dutch patients, was recently followed by an
cluster of cases in the south of the Netherlands.
Clearly in an age of increased efforts to prevent hepatitis B
transmission by blood transfusion, the problem of trans-
mission of HBV from surgeons to patients should be
addressed more thoroughly.
Thus, to answer the first question of this article: yes, there
is a problem. The problem appears confined to surgeons who
perform exposure-prone proceedures. However, the problem
is not limited to those who are HBeAg positive.
HEPATITIS B VIROLOGY AND THE RISK
OF TRANSMISSION
In the CDC survey all HCWs implicated in transmitting HBV
to patients were HBeAg positive. The HBeAg is a non-
structural viral protein and unlikely to be directly associated
with the infectivity of inapparently transmitted blood.
HBeAg should be considered a marker of high levels of cir-
culating virus, and the level of viraemia has been found to be
associated with the risk of perinatal HBV transmission [7].
In the 1990s there was increased awareness that HBeAg-
negative mutants of HBV may also reach high levels of vi-
raemia, and that the occurrence of this type of HBV is not
confined to the countries around the Mediterranean Sea.
It is therefore to be anticipated that a more reliable esti-
mate of infectivity can be obtained by testing serum for the
viral load of HBV. In Germany this approach has been fol-
lowed since 1992. The German Society of Virology has
recommended that HBeAg-positive HCWs with £ 105 HBV
genomes ml)1 of serum need not be excluded from exposure-
prone work [8]. With regard to this recommendation it is
important to know the serum levels of HBV of the HBeAg-
negative surgeons implicated in transmission of HBV. In fact,
all of the four HBeAg-negative surgeons who transmitted
HBV had serum HBV DNA concentrations higher than
105 genomes ml)1 [3].
The German authors point to an important aspect if their
recommendation is to be widely adopted, namely that of the
need for accurate assays of HBV DNA. Available commercial
test kits have good reproducibility, but use highly divergent
standards. Most assays underestimate the true number of
genomes by a factor of 10–50 [9–11]. All four infected
surgeons had greater than 107 genomes if the published
genome concentrations are corrected. If one corrects the
original recommendation in view of the new calibrations,
the current recommendation would be to institute specific
measures only for surgeons with greater than 106 ge-
nomes ml)1 [8].
THE SOLUTION
In the CDC guidelines of 1991 recommendations with regard
to HBV were made:
• HCWs who perform exposure-prone procedures and who
do not have serological evidence of immunity to HBV from
vaccination or from previous infection should know their
hepatitis B surface antigen (HBsAg) status and, if that is
positive, should also know their HBeAg status.
• HCWs who are infected with HBV and are HBeAg positive
should not perform exposure-prone procedures unless
they have sought counsel from an expert review panel and
been advised under what circumstances, if any, they may
continue to perform these procedures.
These guidelines appear — today — still a sensible
approach to the problem if HBeAg testing is replaced
by quantitative testing of HBV DNA.
The underestimation of the risk of HBV transmission by
surgeons, however, has led to minimal endorsement of these
guidelines in many countries in Europe and probably else-
where in the world. Whereas HBV vaccination of HCWs is
now common practice, the follow-up of those who have not
responded to the vaccine is often incomplete, in particular
with regard to HBsAg, HBeAg and HBV DNA testing. Also,
national or regional review panels consisting of an infectious
disease specialist with expertise in the epidemiology of HBV
transmission, a hospital epidemiologist, a laboratory virolo-
gist and a state or local public health official, are almost non-
existent (such review panels should be completed in each
case with the HCW’s personal physician and a health pro-
fessional with expertise in the procedures performed by the
HCW).
Thus, to answer the second question of this article: yes,
there is a solution to the problem. The solution needs to be
implemented first by endorsement of the national health
board of the (modified) guidelines of the CDC and second by
extensive advertisement of the guidelines among the HCW
societies, in particular the surgical societies.
THE HBsAg-POSITIVE SURGEON
Specific measures to limit HCWs in their profession are based
on epidemiological evidence of the risk of transmission. In
that setting, doctor-to-patient transmission of HBV has not
been documented in HCWs who adhere to universal proce-
dures and have HBV DNA levels of 106 genomes ml)1 or less
(corrected methodology). Therefore, unless new evidence
emerges and allowing for a safety margin, it could be
proposed that the HBsAg-positive surgeon with repeated
measurements of 0.5–1 · 105 genomes ml)1 or less should
be allowed to carry out normal professional work without
restrictions.
HBsAg-positive individuals with HBV DNA < 106 ge-
nomes ml)1 are usually HBeAg negative. In the large ma-
jority the HBV infection remains stable, particularly if serum
aminotransferase (ALT) levels are normal. In those with el-
evated serum ALT, hepatitis flares associated with increased
levels of HBV DNA occur in » 5% of individuals per year. It
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appears prudent to monitor those individuals regularly to
allow intervention to minimize the risk of transmission and
the progression of their liver disease.
The HBsAg-positive surgeon with HBV DNA greater than
106 genomes ml)1 then poses a risk of transmitting HBV to
his patients and specific measures are needed. Much of the
discussion in the literature has focused on restrictions to
perform exposure-prone procedures or all procedures. This
approach is sensible from the viewpoint of the public health
sector that assumes limited possibility in modifying the level
of viraemia in the infected person. The proven effect of
antiviral therapy in reducing the transmission of HIV from
pregnant women to their babies [13], however, suggests that
the approach of medically reducing viraemia is feasible and
could also be applicable to HBV transmission.
Lamivudine is an oral drug with strong anti-HBV activity.
The drug, which has minimal side-effects and can be taken
for years, reduces the level of HBV DNA to below 107 ge-
nomes ml)1 in 60–90% of patients, and HBeAg serocon-
version is observed in » 20% [14]. Therefore, in a proportion
of HBsAg-positive surgeons, high-level viraemia might be
adequately suppressed by lamivudine monotherapy. In
fact, such an approach has been successfully applied in
practice (Fig. 1).
Long-term lamivudine monotherapy is associated with
non-compliance or emergence of resistance in 14–38% of
individuals after 1 year [14,15] and in up to 50% after
3 years [16]. Therefore, it is mandatory that regular monit-
oring of HBV DNA is instituted. The concept of antiviral
therapy for HBsAg-positive surgeons with high-level vira-
emia will – in all likelihood – develop further with the in-
troduction of other effective anti-HBV drugs [17] and
combination therapy [18,19].
HBsAg-positive surgeons found to have high-level vira-
emia should consider antiviral therapy; if virus suppression
is successful, it could open the possibility of returning to a
full range of professional work.
IMPLEMENTATION
Once a scientifically sound policy for HBsAg-positive HCWs
is proposed, it is necessary to gain support for this policy,
both from the professional groups (i.e. health care personnel
performing high-risk procedures) and from the public at
Fig. 1 In a health care worker (HCW) lamivudine monotherapy rapidly reduces serum hepatitis B virus (HBV) DNA levels
to below 106 genomes ml)1 with a parallel fall in hepatitis B e antigen (HBeAg) expressed in Paul Ehrlich units ml)1. In
this patient HBV DNA in serum became undetectable by sensitive polymerase chain reaction (PCR) (detection limit < 400 ge-
nomes ml)1) in conjuction with a HBeAg seroconversion. After withdrawal of therapy parameters of viral replication
returned to pretreatment levels. Reintroduction of lamivudine successfully resuppressed viral replication.
gEq ml)1, genome equivalents ml)1; HBeAb, antibody to hepatitis B e antigen.
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large. This support is necessary in order to establish actual
practice guidelines.
This process involves three steps:
1 The first step is submitting the proposed policy to a group of
experts, representing the scientific community. In the
Dutch situation this means that the National Health
Council, the scientific advisory board for the government
on health matters, must explicitly consent to the proposal.
2 A second step involves discussing the policy with the
societies that represent the professional groups involved,
such as surgeons. Based on the overall prevalence of HBV
in the Netherlands [20] and the number of registered
specialists performing surgery [21], it can be inferred that
testing all involved specialists for hepatitis B carriership
would result in identifying 10–20 physicians in the
Netherlands as carriers. It can be expected that the
concept of banning all carriers from performing high-risk
procedures will meet resistance. Reducing this number by
introducing HBV DNA levels as an additional criterion,
and facilitating antiviral therapy in those with high-level
viraemia, would make it easier to accept practice guide-
lines. The establishment of a panel of experts to consider
individual cases might be an important additional feature
to persuade the professional societies.
3 The third step should warrant the acceptance by the
public at large, the future patients. In the Dutch situation,
patient’s groups are, at a national level, represented by the
Federation of Patients and Consumer Organizations in the
Netherlands. This federation is usually involved in policy
discussions involving patients’ rights. For (future) patients
(and the organization representing them), it might be
difficult to accept that HCWs, who are carriers of the virus,
will be allowed to continue to perform exposure-prone
procedures. However, if the proposed policy is scientifically
sound, it is up to the Federation to come forward with an
alternative solution that in an equally fair way balances
the rights of the professionals and the patients.
As every HCW is obliged to provide appropriate care, it
seems a logical step that the professional societies themselves
endorse the practice guidelines and inform their members.
The management of hospitals and other health care pro-
viders has its own responsibility to protect the safety of pa-
tients for whom they provide care. Therefore, it should
enforce adherence to the guidelines.
Last but not least, the Inspectorate of Health Care, the
Ministerial body for assessment of quality of health care, will
supervise the implementation of the proper guidelines and, if
necessary, impose them.
Once the guidelines are implemented, it follows that the
management of health care providers will require informa-
tion regarding the HBV status of all HCWs that perform
exposure-prone procedures. If a carrier state is established,
proof must be submitted that HBV DNA levels are and re-
main within the accepted limits. For the carrier this means
granting permission to disclose the results of the pertaining
serum tests to a (by the management) designated person.
As information regarding the HBV status will have to be
submitted in certain circumstances during their professional
career, it is in the interest of medical students to be aware of
their HBV status at an early stage. If treatment does not
result in acceptable HBV DNA levels, they can choose a
medical career that does not involve performing exposure-
prone procedures. When would be the right moment to
establish the HBV status of medical students?
Obviously, it should be linked to well-established policy to
immunize medical students against hepatitis B [22]. Good
immunization practice includes checking the postvaccina-
tion hepatitis B surface antibody (HBsAb) titre. This proce-
dure can be expanded to identify a carrier state in the case of
non-responders. Immunization and serological follow-up
could be linked to the preclinical training in virology.
In our opinion, medical students who are non-responders,
but have been shown to be non-carriers, should be allowed
to perform exposure-prone procedures, on the condition that
they are checked at regular intervals for hepatitis B infection,
e.g. every 6–12 months.
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